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Schmitt v. Commonwealth
547 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 200[ 1])
. Fao
On February 17,1999, Earl Shelton Dunning ("Dunning") was shot and
killed while working as a security guard at the Bon Air branch of NationsBank
("the bank") on Buford Road in Chesterfield County. Around 1-00 pan on that
day, John Yancey Schmitt ("Schmitt") entered the bank wearing dark sunglasses
and a bulky jacket. One of the tellers, Sara Parker-Orr ("Parker-Orr") noticed
Schmitt when he entered and thought it odd that he was wearing sunglasses on
a doudy day. After Schmitt entered the bank, Dunning went inside and stood
at the end of the teller line in which customers were waiting. Schmitt was in line
behind several customers. Parker-Orr testified that Schmitt left his place in line
and walked over to where Dunning was standing. Seconds later, Parker-Orr
heard two gunshots and someone screaming, "Get down, get down." Dunning
had been shot in the chest. Schmitt then approached Parker-Orr, as well as the
other tellers, and demanded all of their money. Schmitt threatened to kill every-
bodyif he was not given all of the money.'
The bank's security camera recorded Schmitt standing at a teller window
holding a bag and pointing a gun. While the robberywas recorded on the bank's
security camera, the shooting of Dunning was not. Parker-Orr and the three
other tellers did not see Schmitt shoot the security guard. However, they did
identify Schmitt as the man who robbed the bank that day.'
After the murder and the robbery, Schmitt registered at a Williamsburg
hotel the same day under the name "R. Napier." He paid cash for a three day
stay. The desk clerk identified Schmitt and said that after checking in, Schmitt
changed his hair color. Schmitt was identified byCaptain Karl S. Leonard of the
Chesterfield CountyPolice Department using the bank camera's securityphoto-
graphs. On February 19, 1999, the police discovered that Schmitt was staying in
Williamsburg. The James CtyCountyTactical Team surrounded Schmitt's hotel
room, and a crisis negotiator, Lieutenant Diane M Clarcq of the James City
CountyPolice Department, attempted to persuade Schmitt to surrender. Schmitt
surrendered the next morning and was taken into police custody. The hotel
room was searched and along with a handgun and several new items of clothing,
the police found $27,091 in cash, most of which was still wrapped in "bank
1. Schmit v. Commonwea, 547 SE2d 186, 192 (Va. 2001[D.
2. Id at 192.
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bands" identifying the money as coming from the Bon Air branch of
NationsBank.'
Schmitt was indicted for murder during the commission of a robbery, armed
entry of a bank with the intent to commit larceny, two counts of robbery, and
three counts of use of a firearm.' In the guilt phase of the trial, the jury con-
victed Schmitt of all of the offenses charged. In the penaltyphase of the trial, the
jury fixed his punishment for capital murder at death based on a finding of future
dangerousness, and fixed the sentence for the other offenses at imprisonment for
118 years The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated Schmitt's automatic
appeal of the death sentence with all of Schmitt's other claims on appeal.'
11 Hdd.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed each of Schmitt's convictions, and
after reviewing Schmitt's death sentence, declined to commute the sentence of
death! The court found that the jury was properly selected, the evidence was
sufficient to show premeditation to support the capital murder charge, that
statements appellant made to a hostage negotiator were not statements against
Schnitt's penal interest, that the jury was properly instructed, and that Schmitt
was properly sentenced! There were other issues which the court did not rule
upon because Schmitt waived his right to appeal or defaulted those issues
3. Id
4. Id; sealso VA. GODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) (Mchie Supp. 2001) (stating that "the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or attempted
robberif shall constitute a capital murder); VA. GODE ANN. S 18.2-93 (MlNchie 2000) (stating that
any person armed with a deadlyweapon, who enters a bank with the intent to commit larceny shall
be guilty of a Class 2 felony); VA. CODE ANN. 5182-58 (Mlchie 2000) (any person committing
robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon shall be guilty of a felony and sentenced for a term
of life or not less than five years); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.-53.1 (Mfichie 2000) (making it unlawful
for anyone to use a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery).
5. Sdc t 547 S.E2d at 191.
6. Id at 192.
7. Id at 204.
8. Id at 196-202.
9. Id at 194. Several of Schmitt's claims were summanlydismissed bythe court and are not
discussed in detail in this note.
First, Schmitt claimed that the trial court failed to strim juror, James J. Goodin, for cause
based on his statements concerning the death penalty. Id Schmitt failed to ask the trial court to
strike the juror and therefore waived his right to object. Id
Second, Schmitt contended that the trial court erred in excluding prospective jurors, Linda
Miles and Leo Gibbs. Id Both of these prospective jurors expressed objctions to the death
penalty. Schmitt claims that the failure of the court to exclude is an example of a 'pattern of seating
pro-death penalty jurors." Id Again, because Schmitt failed to make these objections in the trial
court, he waived his right to appeal on these issues. Id; swa/so VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25 (2001) (stating
that an '[e]rror will not be sustained to anyruling of the trial court or the commission before which
the case was intially tried unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of
the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice").
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III. A /ibsis Apmia in M
A. Jty Sdeaion
Schmitt argued that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to
strike jurors who favored the death penalty, it excluded jurors who opposed the
death penalty, and it failed to strike a juror that had once been a bank teller."0
The court stated that "[a] prospective juror should be excluded for cause based
on the juror's views about the death penalty if those views would substantially
impair or prevent the performance of the juror's duties in accordance with his
oath and the court's instructions." " The court further stated that the trial court
is in the best position to determine whether a juror can perform his duties in
accordance with the court's instructions. 2 A trial court's decision regarding the
selection or exclusion of jurors will be upheld unless the trial court abused its
discretion.13 The two jurors who were seated on the jury who were in favor of
the death penalty both said during voir dire that they would be able to listen to
the evidence presented with an open mind and follow the instructions of the
judge.' The bank teller testified that she could follow the law as instructed by
Third, Schmitt argued that the capital murder charge should be struck on the grounds that
the charge encouraged the juryMto e harsher sentences on the non-capital offenses. Sdritt,
547 S.E2d at 194. Due to Shmit's failre to raise this issue at the trial court, the issue was waived
for appeal. Id; seaso VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5"25 (2001).
Fourth, Schmitt filed a pre-trial motion to bar admission, during thepenaltyphase of the trial,
of evidence of his previous unadjudicated conduct. Sdmx 547 S.E2d at 194. The trial court
decided to reserve ruling on the motion. kd During the pe ntphase of the trial, Schmitt did not
object to testimony about his unadjudicated conduct Id Schmitt's failure to object during the
penaltyphase waived this objection on appeal. d; seealsoVA. SLP. Cr. . 5:25 (2001).
Fifth, Schmitt argued that the trial court erred in allowing the juryto consider the issue of
future dangerousness because this aggravator is unconstitutionally vague and violates the Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Sm# 547 S.E.2d at 194. Schmit relied on his motion
presented at the trial court regarding this issue, but references to arguments made in the motion
were insufficient and amounted to procedural default onthis issue. Id;seBurns v. Commonwealth,
541 SE.2d 872,881 (Va. 2001) (Mhe court ruled that Burns's reliance on the memorandum that he
presented to the circuit court on the issue of the constitutionality of the Virinia capital murder
statute was insufficient and that he had therefore procedurally defaulted the issue).
Lastly, Schmitt, at the conclusion of his brief, set forth a u trelating to aassign
nents of error" that the alleged errors violated his conutionalrights. Sdmitt 547 S.E2d at 194.
However, because Schmitt failed to specifyin what manner his rights were violated with respect to
each assignment of error, the argument was waived. l
10. Sdmit4 547 S.E2d at 195.
11. Id at 195 (citing Bamabei v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E2d 270, 277 (Va. 1996) (holding
that the trial court was correct in refusing to sit two prospective jurors who were opposed to the
death penalty because the court believed it would substantiallyimpair their performance as jurors)).
12. Id at 195.
13. Id. at 195 (citing Lovittv. Commonwealh, 537 S.E.2d 866,875 (Va. 2000) (holding that
the trial court did not err in allowing juror to sit, who was opposed to the death penalty but stated




the court, so the trial court seated her as welL15 The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the trial court acted properly when it allowed these three jurors to sit.
16
The juror who was opposed to the death penaltystated that she would be unable,
no matter what the circumstances, to vote for the death penalty.1 7 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the trial court properly excluded her."8
Schmitt argued that the trial court erred in limiting his questioning of
prospective jurors during voir dire regarding their views on the death penalty. 9
The trial court refused to allow prospective jurors to respond to hypothetical
questions posed by the defense.20 Under W'tspoo u Ivlin?' and Mo m v
I//imis, a juror should be dismissed for cause if the juror would automatically
vote against the death penalty or if the juror would automatically vote for the
death penalty if the defendant were to be found guilty of capital murder .3
Restrictions on the use of hypotheticals prevents counsel from conducting a
WIdxnpxm and Magm inquiry. Hypotheticals are essential because jurors
supposedly do not know much about this particular case. The only way to
determine whether a juror could consider life or death is to pose hypotheticals.
It is not enough to just ask the question: "Would you ever impose the death
penalty?" While it is true that the questions to a prospective juror must be posed
with reference to the juror's ability to consider the evidence and the court's
instructions, hypotheticals are still necessaryto determine whether the juror can
truly consider both life and death. By not allowing the hypothetical questions,
limits are placed on the defense in determining where potential jurors stand on
the issue of the death penalty.
Schmitt further argued that the trial court irproperly asked leading ques-
tions of prospective jurors during voir dire in order to rehabilitate them24 When
the judge asks leading questions the defense counsel must object the moment the
question is asked.25 Schmitt did not object to the leading questions specifically






21. 391 US. 510 (1968).
22. 504 US. 719 (1992).
23. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510 (1968) (holding that a juror could not be dismissed
for cause for general objections to the death penahl); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 US. 719 (1992)
(holding that a judge must ask, if requested by counsel, whether a potential juror would autornati-
caly vote for the death penalty if the defendant was found guilty of capital murder).




but rather made a general objection at the end of the voir dire. The appellate
court therefore considered the objections 'waived because they were untimely.27
B. da.ar= Agzi5t Pemd In t
Schmitt argued that the trial court ened in refusing to permit the crisis
negotiator, Lieutenant Clarq, to testify about statements that Schmitt made
regarding the robbery and the shooting." The statements included Schmitt's
admission that he committed the robbery and his claim that he did not intend to
kill Dunning, but rather, shot him during a struggle.' The court disagreed with
Schmitt that the statements were admissible as a declaration against his penal
interest.30 Declarations against penal interest are an exception to the hearsayrule
which allows out-of-court statements that tend to incriminate a declaramt to be
received in evidence upon a showing that the declaration is reliable and that the
declarant is presently unavailable.? When the declarant has made a statement
that is contraryto his self-interest, this "element of self-interest" functions as a
"reasonablysafe substitute for the oath and cross-examination as a guarantee of
truth."31 The court believed that the statements that Schmitt wanted admitted
constituted a self serving denial of criminal intent. For this reason, the court
ruled that the statements were not declarations against penal interest.'
C Samtuv$Isslas
1. E tidaxe f Viainds 06wrar
The Commonwealth was allowed to present testimony from the victim's
friends at the sentencing phase of the trial.35 Several bank employees testified
about his kindness and generositytoward his fellow employees . The Common-
wealth presented testimonythat he was the father of three children and was soon
26. Id at 197.
27. Id
28. Id at 198.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Se Ellison v. Commonwealth 247 SE2.2d 685, 688 (Va. 1978) (holding that, while a
declaration against penal interest is an exception to the hearsaynrle, the declaration is only admissi-
ble upon a showing that the declaration is reliable).
32. Newberryv. Commonwealth, 61 S.E.2d 318, 326 (Va. 1950) (stating that admissions that
are contrary to self interest, even those generally considered hearsay, are admissible so long as the
evidence is important to the ends of justice and the element of self-interest affords a reasonably safe
substitute for the oath and cross examination as a guarantee of truth).
33. Sdmia, 547 S.E.2d at 198.
34. Id




to be married. 7 The admission of this testimony about the victim should be
compared to the denial of testimony about the victim in Lenz v Cwmn==Wd
and Rariton v Cw wad. In Lez, the court refused to allow evidence of
the victim's prior record showing that the victim was a murderer.'° The court
stated, "[t]he victim's prior convictions had no relevance to the issue whether the
defendant's acts were vile, inhuman, or showed depravity of mind, and the
victim's criminal record was not relevant to the issue whether the defendant
would constitute a serious continuing threat to society.""1 In Rerirt the court
relied on the Lenz decision in determining that "generally, a defendant does not
have a constitutional right to present evidence of a victim's criminal history."42
It is difficult to determine what, if any, relevance statements about the victim's
history or character have on the determination of a sentence. The evidence
about the degree of harm or loss caused by the crime is not relevant to the
determination about vileness and/or future dangerousness that the jury is
required to make when determining whether to givelife or death." The court
has now permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that portrays the
victim in a positive light, but has disallowed defendant's attempts to introduce
evidence that portrays the victim in a negative light. If the court allows the
introduction of victim evidence at all, then it should not matter whether the
evidence is good or bad.
2 Cnii z cfr eraim
Schmitt contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence
concerning prison life to rebut the Commonwealth's arguments on future
dangerousness." Schmitt claimed that in capital murder sentencing, such evi-
dence is relevant to the issue of whether a defendant will pose a future threat to
society." Smmr v Scaah Gvmi 6 held that in a case in which future danger-
ousness is at issue and the onlyaltemative to a sentence of death under applicable
37. Id
38. 544 S.E.2d 299 (Va. 2001).
39. Se also Remington v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E2d 620 (Va. 2001) (holding that a
defendant has no constitutional right to present evidence of a victim's criminal history); Lenz v.
Commonwealth, 544 SE.2d 299 (Va. 2001) (holding that the victim's prior criminal record had no
relevance in determining whether the defendant's acts were vile or showed a likelihood of future
dangerousness); MythriA.Jayaraman, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 151(2001) (analyzing Remington
v. Commonwealth and Lenz v. Commonwealth).
40. Lim, 544 S.E2d at 307.
41. Id
42. Rvi" 551 S.E2d at 635.
43. SeeMatthewL Engle,DwPiuat Lin acn Vic6?nIq=E' ik 13 CAP.DEF.J. 55,
63 (2000).
44. Sdmi 547 S1.2d at 199.
45. id
46. 512 US. 154 (1994).
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law is life without parole, due process requires that the jury be told that "life
means life."47 In Virginia, those convicted of capital murder are ineligible for
parole. Therefore, when determining whether the defendant will pose a continu-
ous threat to society, the society referred to must be prison society because the
defendant will never again be a member of any other society." For this reason
evidence of prison life becomes highly relevant. The Supreme Court of Virginia
has held that prison life testimony is not admissible as mitigation evidence,
however, it should be used to rebut future dangerousness.4  In Ganrr v
F/orti4s5 the United States Supreme Court ruled that capital defendants have a
constitutional right to present evidence which rebuts the proposition that the
defendant poses a future danger to society."1 In the case at hand, the court
concluded that because the Commonwealth had not presented evidence concern-
ing prison security, the evidence proffered by Schmitt was not admissible to
rebut particular evidence concerning prison securityor prison conditions offered
by the Commonwealth.52 However, the court was mistaken. The Common-
wealth did make reference to prison life during dosing argument.53 The prosecu-
tor mentioned prison life in his closing argument when he talked about the
"wonderful life" Schmitt would have were he sentenced to life imprisonment.5'
Because the Commonwealth made reference to prison life and because the
defendant has a constitutional right to rebut the Commonwealth's argument of
future dangerousness, the court should have allowed prison life evidence to be
introduced.
3. Vilenes
Schmitt next argued that the trial court erred in allowing the Common-
wealth to present evidence regarding vileness and in allowing the juryto consider
this factor." Schmitt claimed that although the jury did not use the vileness
47. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); seegwmyKathryn Roe Eldridge, Case
Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 89 (2001) (analyzing Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. C. 1263 (2001) (holding
by the Supreme Court of the United States that the Surmm instruction that life means life does
apply when future dangerousness is at issue)).
48. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Mfichie 2000) (stating that anyperson sentenced to life
imprisonment is ineligible for parole).
49. Swgnady Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001) (allowing for limited
rebuttal on the relevance of prison life evidence to future dangerousness).
50. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
51. Gardner v. Florida, 430 US. 349 (1977).
52. Shn* 547 S.E2d at 199.
53. Id
54. Id at 200.
55. Id at 201; sw also Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 SE.2d 520 (Va. 1983) (holding that
the jury fixed punishment at death based upon a finding of future dangerousness rather than




factorin its determination to impose the death penalty, the arguments concerning
vileness were prejudicial to the jury's consideration of future dangerousness.6
The court ruled that the jury's rejection of the vileness claim is proof that they




Schmitt further claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding of future dangerousness." Future dangerousness refers to the
probabilitythat the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a "continuing serious threat to society."" The court has held that the
"facts and circumstances surrounding a capital murder maybe sufficient, stand-
ing alone, to support a finding of future dangerousness."' 6 In this case, Schmitt
murdered Dunning, a security guard, to facilitate a robbery.'1 The Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that the jury was entitled to find that this violent act was
sufficient to show "future dangerousness."' By ruling that the violent act itself
was enough to am the requirements for future dangerousness, the court
effectively ruled that every capital murder meets the future dangerousness
requirement because a violent act is implicit in a capital murder.
5. Midg Fa-M
Schmitt also asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on mitigating factors.' Schmitt claimed that he was under the influence of
controlled substances, that he had shown remorse for his actions, and that a term
of life imprisonment would be served without parole.6' The court ruled that
Schmitt was not entitled to a jury instruction at e hLasized any particular
56. Sdndi, 547 S.E.2d at 201.
57. Id
58. Id
59. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-2642 (Miclie 2000) (stating that "a sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless a jury finds a threat of future dangerousness or vileness and recommends
that the death penalty be imposed").
60. Sdmit 547 S.E.2d at 201; see Lovitt v. Commonweath, 537 SE.2d 866,878 (Va. 2000)
(holding that the facts and circumstances surrounding a capital murder maybe sufficient standing
alone to support a fiading of future dangerousness).
61. Sdm, 547 SE.d at 192.
62. Id at 201 (stating that 'the jurywas entitled to find that this violent, premeditated action
was strong evidence that Schmitt is a dangerous person who would commit future criminal acts of
violence-).








Virginia Code Section 17.1-313(Q requires the Supreme Court of Virginia
to review death sentences to determine whether theyare: (1) "imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor"; and (2) "excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases."" Schmitt argued
that the sentence was based on passion, prejudice and arbitrariness because: (1)
the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to argue that Schmitt's crime
satisfied the aggravating factor of vileness; (2) evidence and testimony was
allowed that inflamed the passions of the jury, and (3) the prosecutor engaged in
raising the juror's passions by making improper remarks encouraging them to
vote for the death penalty.
6 7
The court found no merit in Schmitt's claims." According to the court, the
introduction of the vileness aggravating factor clearly did not affect the death
sentence ruling because the jury rejected the use of vileness as an aggravating
factor in its determination to impose the death penalty.69 The court found that
the testimonywas properlyadmitted as evidence and the jurywas entitled to view
all the available evidence in making its sentence determination." As for the
prosecution's comments, the court found no reason to believe that any of the
comments influenced the * s verdict.
71
When determining whether the sentence was disproportionate or excessive,
the court must look at how other sentencing bodies in the jurisdiction generally
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, considering both
the crime and the defendant. The court focused on other capital murder cases
in which the death penaltywas obtained under the predicate of future dangerous-
ness.73 The court found, with some exceptions, that the death sentence has
generally been imposed where there is a finding of future dangerousness and the
underlying crime was robbery.7 4
65. Id (citing Burns v. Commonwealth 541 S.E2d 872, 895 (Va. 2001) (holding that
defendant convicted of capital murder is not entitled to a jury instruction that emphasizes a
particular mitigating factor)).
66. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q (Mfichie 2000).
67. Sdmrk, 547 S.E.2d at 202, 203.




72. SeeasoVA. CODE ANN. 5 17.1-313(C) (Mlchie 1999) (mandating that a reviewing court
reviews the death sentence imposed to determine whether it (1) has been "imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or anyother arbitrary factor"; or (2) "is excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant").
73. Sdmi 547 S.E.2d at 203.





The appellant in this case had multiple issues to appeaL Unfortunatelymany
of the issues were waived for failure to object at the proper time. 5 Schmitt failed
to make a timelyobjection to the seating of the jury. There are several objections
that must be made when objecting to the seating of a jury. 6 First, defense
counsel must object when the challenge for cause is overruled." The defense
counsel must object to the seating of the jury.78 Counsel cannot be forced to use
a peremptory strike to strike a juror who should have been excluded for cause."
If it is necessary to use a peremptory strike to strike a juror who was not ex-
cluded on a challenge for cause, defense counsel must still object to the seating
of the jury, but can agree to the seating of the jury subject to prior objections.8
2. TialJme's Quat at VoirDie
Schmitt argued that the trial court improperly asked leading questions of
prospective jurors during voir dire."' The judge's voir dire was done to "rehabili-
tate" and make the jurors appear to be qualified. 2 The judge, as claimed by
Schmitt, acted "inappropriatel y" byasking prospective jurors whether theycould
fairly consider both sentencing alternatives, thereby "hindering [Schmitt's]
opportunityto get a valid response." 3 The issue was waived on appeal because
an objection based on the judge asking leading questions must be made when the
question was asked and Schmitt failed to do this. 4
future dangerousness when the under crime was robbery. Seee.g., Mclean v. Commonwealth,
516 S.E2d 717 (Va. C. App. 1999); Mundyv. Commonwealh, 390 S E.2d 525 (Va. at App. 1990);
Rea v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 464 (Va. G. App. 1992).
75. Sdmi, 547 S.E.2d at 195.
76. Id
77. See Beavers v. Commonwealh, 427 S.E2d 411, 418-19 (Va. 1993) (holding that when a
juror is struck for cause an objection must be made immediately or the issue is waived).
78. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E2d 785 (Va. 1989) (holding that if a partyobjects to
rulings made during voir dire of a prospective juror but subsequently fails to object to the seating
of that juror, the party has waived the voir dire objections).
79. SeeMurrayv. Commonwealth, No.0874-00-4,2001WL345780,at* (Va. CtApp. Apr.
10, 2001) (holding that if the judge errs in denying defense challenge for cause, the error survives
defense counsels use of a peremptory to strike the juror).
80. Id (finding that defendan did not waive objection to seating of juror by agreeing to seat
juror because defendant did so while preserving the prior objection).







Schmitt argued that the trial court erred in not allowing his jury instruction.
He noted that the Commonwealth's failure to produce the two bank customers
that were behind Schmitt in line allowed the jury to presume that the testimony
of those witnesses was unfavorable to the Commonwealth.3 The Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that the trial court's refusal of the instruction was the
correct ruling because the Commonwealth's burden of proof does not include
"the dutyto produce all witnesses possiblyhaving some knowledge of a case." 6
Schmitt also objected to the use of the instruction that it is "permissible to infer
that every person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her
acts. 7 Schmitt argued that this diminished the presumption of innocence."
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that this instruction did not establish an
improper presumption but rather stated a permissive inference. 9 Objections to
jury instructions must be made when the jury instructions are issued.'
4. Cawnz mab's CigA rWnent
Schmitt objected to the following comments made bythe prosecutor during
his closing argument: "(1) Schmitt's use of a stolen gun when the Common-
wealth earlier had stipulated that the gun was not stolen; (2) Schmitt's prior
'shotn assault' on his girlfriend; and 3) the 'wonderful life' in prison Schmitt
would have were he sentenced to life risonment."' 1 Schmitt caimed that his
fair trial and due process rights were vio=ted. The Supreme Court of Virginia
disagreed.93 Schmitt objected when the Commonwealth made the comment
about Schmitt's use of the stolen gun and the trial court promptly gave explicit
curative instructions. The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that without
evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that the jury followed the
instructions that were given.
95
As to the comments about the "shotgun assault" and the "wonderful life,"
Schmitt failed to make a request for a curative instruction or mistrial at the time




89. Id at 199 (stating that the instruction did not establish an improper presumption but
rather stated a permissive inference) (atugKelly v. Commonwealth 382 S.E.2d 270, 278 (Va. C.
App. 1989)).
90. VA. SUP. Cr. R 5.25 (2001) (stating that an "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling of
the trial court or the commission before which the case was initiallytried unless the objection was
stated with reasonable certaintyat the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable
this Court to attain the ends of justice").







the remarks were made so the objections were waived. A defendant must
object to comments made during the dosing arumaent immediatelyfollow"ng the
objectionable comme-nt. 7 While the issues m this case were rejected by the
court, the issues that were waived or procedurallydefaulted mayhave had merit.
Unfortunately, those issues were never deat with because Schmitt failed to raise
objections at the right time."
Cynthia M. Bruce
96. Id
97. Id at 200-01.
98. SenermManhewK.Mahoney, Bri dx dIDqk z 12 CAP. DEF.J. 305
(2000).
[Vol. 14:1
